A Comparison of Cooperation Models: The Impact of Foreign Digital Investments on African Autonomy¶

Research Question: How does the competition between China's Digital Silk Road and the European Global Gateway influence digital autonomy in Africa?

Introduction¶

The digital transformation of Africa is taking place at the crossroads of two geopolitical strategies. China's Digital Silk Road (DSR), part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has seen Chinese companies, notably Huawei and ZTE emerge as the preferred providers of Africa's telecommunications infrastructure (CFPA, n.d.). In contrast, the 2021-launched European Union's Global Gateway prioritises regulatory frameworks, data management and democracy.

The stakes are significant. Africa's digital infrastructure is more than a question of speed: it is about data sovereignty, cybersecurity risk, regulatory compatibility and ultimately the sovereignty of African nations. This report draws on empirical evidence of Chinese credit, investment and trade relations to examine the DSR's impact on Africa, and to assess whether the EU's alternative is a genuine alternative or rhetorical.

Three case studies anchor the analysis: Togo (Novissi AI-powered social protection), South Africa (Huawei/ZTE vs. BCX/MTN), and Ethiopia (green industrial parks). The Italian Mattei Plan is also considered as a complementary European initiative.

Methodology¶

This report builds on three key datasets put together by the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University:

  • CLA Database (2025): 1,319 Chinese loan commitments to Africa across 14 sectors (2000–2023), used to isolate ICT lending patterns (CLA, 2024).
  • FDI Data (Nov 2025): Chinese outward FDI stock and flow to African countries by year and sector (2003–2024) (Statista, 2024).
  • Trade Data (Nov 2025): China–Africa bilateral trade (exports and imports) by country from 1992 onward.

These are complemented by qualitative data from the Africa China Centre for Policy & Advisory (ACCPA) on FOCAC 2024 pledges, data on digital access from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and secondary sources on the EU Global Gateway and Mattei Plan.

The analytical approach combines:

  1. Longitudinal trend analysis of Chinese ICT lending
  2. Country-level mapping of digital infrastructure loans
  3. Sectoral FDI decomposition
  4. Comparative case studies
  5. A structured assessment of EU vs. China digital engagement models
In [4]:
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import matplotlib.ticker as mticker
import numpy as np
import warnings
warnings.filterwarnings('ignore')

# Set global plot style
plt.rcParams['figure.figsize'] = (12, 6)
plt.rcParams['axes.spines.top'] = False
plt.rcParams['axes.spines.right'] = False
plt.rcParams['font.family'] = 'DejaVu Sans'

# ── File paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PATH = r"C:\Users\Lenovo\Downloads"

CLA_FILE    = PATH + r"\CLA-Database-Raw-Data-Public-2025-FIN.xlsx"
FDI_FILE    = PATH + r"\FDIData_Nov2025.xlsx"
TRADE_FILE  = PATH + r"\TradeData_Nov2025.xlsx"

# ── Load CLA dataset ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
df_cla_raw = pd.read_excel(CLA_FILE, sheet_name='2025', header=0)
df_cla_raw.columns = df_cla_raw.iloc[0]
df_cla = df_cla_raw.iloc[1:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_cla.columns = [str(c).strip() for c in df_cla.columns]
df_cla['Year'] = pd.to_numeric(df_cla['Year'], errors='coerce')
df_cla['Loan (USD M)'] = pd.to_numeric(df_cla['Loan (USD M)'], errors='coerce')

# ── Load FDI dataset ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
df_fdi_flow_raw = pd.read_excel(FDI_FILE, sheet_name='CN_Africa_FDI_Flow', header=0)
df_fdi_flow_raw.columns = df_fdi_flow_raw.iloc[0]
df_fdi_flow = df_fdi_flow_raw.iloc[1:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_fdi_flow.rename(columns={df_fdi_flow.columns[0]: 'Year'}, inplace=True)
df_fdi_flow['Year'] = pd.to_numeric(df_fdi_flow['Year'], errors='coerce')

df_fdi_graph_raw = pd.read_excel(FDI_FILE, sheet_name='Graph', header=0)
df_fdi_graph_raw.columns = df_fdi_graph_raw.iloc[0]
df_fdi_graph = df_fdi_graph_raw.iloc[1:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_fdi_graph.columns = ['Year', 'China_FDI_bn', 'US_FDI_bn']
df_fdi_graph['Year'] = pd.to_numeric(df_fdi_graph['Year'], errors='coerce')
df_fdi_graph['China_FDI_bn'] = pd.to_numeric(df_fdi_graph['China_FDI_bn'], errors='coerce')
df_fdi_graph['US_FDI_bn'] = pd.to_numeric(df_fdi_graph['US_FDI_bn'], errors='coerce')

# ── Load Trade dataset ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
df_trade_raw = pd.read_excel(TRADE_FILE, sheet_name='Graphs 2', header=0)
df_trade_raw.columns = df_trade_raw.iloc[1]
df_trade = df_trade_raw.iloc[2:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_trade.columns = ['Year', 'CN_EX', 'CN_IM', 'CN_Total', 'US_EX', 'US_IM', 'US_Total', 'extra']
for col in df_trade.columns:
    df_trade[col] = pd.to_numeric(df_trade[col], errors='coerce')
df_trade = df_trade.dropna(subset=['Year'])

print("✓ CLA loaded:", df_cla.shape)
print("✓ FDI flow loaded:", df_fdi_flow.shape)
print("✓ FDI graph loaded:", df_fdi_graph.shape)
print("✓ Trade loaded:", df_trade.shape)

# ── Isolate ICT loans ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
df_ict = df_cla[df_cla['Sector'] == 'Information and Communication Technology'].copy()
print(f"\n✓ ICT loans: {len(df_ict)} records | Total value: ${df_ict['Loan (USD M)'].sum():,.1f}M")
✓ CLA loaded: (1319, 13)
✓ FDI flow loaded: (42, 60)
✓ FDI graph loaded: (22, 3)
✓ Trade loaded: (0, 8)

✓ ICT loans: 160 records | Total value: $15,259.1M

1. China's Digital Silk Road: The Lending Footprint¶

The Digital Silk Road is much more than a foreign policy term, as it has concrete material implications. According to the CARI loan database, there have been 160 Chinese loans in the ICT sector committed to Africa from 2000 until 2023, amounting to more than $6 billion. It ranks third in number of loans after Transportation and Energy.

The chart below displays the trends in the ICT loans over time and depicts three clear phases: a sharp spike in Angola-focused loans in 2005–2012; a subsequent expansion across the continent during the mid-2010s; and, finally, a more selective approach to lending since 2018, driven by debt sustainability considerations and new Chinese lending priorities set forth after FOCAC.

In [5]:
# ICT loans aggregated by year
ict_by_year = df_ict.groupby('Year')['Loan (USD M)'].sum().reset_index()
ict_by_year = ict_by_year[ict_by_year['Year'].between(2000, 2023)]

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(13, 5))

ax.bar(ict_by_year['Year'], ict_by_year['Loan (USD M)'],
       color='#c0392b', alpha=0.85, edgecolor='white', linewidth=0.5)

ax.set_title("Chinese ICT Loan Commitments to Africa (2000–2023)",
             fontsize=14, fontweight='bold', pad=15)
ax.set_xlabel("Year", fontsize=11)
ax.set_ylabel("Loan Value (USD Million)", fontsize=11)
ax.yaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:,.0f}M'))
ax.set_xticks(range(2000, 2024, 2))
ax.tick_params(axis='x', rotation=45)

# Annotate key peaks
for _, row in ict_by_year[ict_by_year['Loan (USD M)'] > 400].iterrows():
    ax.annotate(f"${row['Loan (USD M)']:.0f}M",
                xy=(row['Year'], row['Loan (USD M)']),
                xytext=(0, 6), textcoords='offset points',
                ha='center', fontsize=8, color='#c0392b')

ax.axvline(x=2015, color='gray', linestyle='--', linewidth=1, alpha=0.6)
ax.text(2015.2, ict_by_year['Loan (USD M)'].max() * 0.9,
        'FOCAC 2015\n($60bn pledge)', fontsize=8, color='gray')

ax.axvline(x=2018, color='steelblue', linestyle='--', linewidth=1, alpha=0.6)
ax.text(2018.2, ict_by_year['Loan (USD M)'].max() * 0.75,
        'FOCAC 2018\n($60bn pledge)', fontsize=8, color='steelblue')

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig1_ict_lending_timeline.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()
print(f"Total ICT loan value: ${ict_by_year['Loan (USD M)'].sum():,.1f}M")
No description has been provided for this image
Total ICT loan value: $15,259.1M
In [6]:
ict_by_country = (df_ict.groupby('Country')['Loan (USD M)']
                  .sum()
                  .sort_values(ascending=True)
                  .tail(15))

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(11, 7))

bars = ax.barh(ict_by_country.index, ict_by_country.values,
               color='#c0392b', alpha=0.8, edgecolor='white')

# Highlight case-study countries
highlights = {'Togo': '#e67e22', 'South Africa': '#2980b9', 'Ethiopia': '#27ae60'}
for bar, country in zip(bars, ict_by_country.index):
    if country in highlights:
        bar.set_color(highlights[country])
        bar.set_alpha(1.0)

ax.set_title("Top 15 African Countries by Chinese ICT Loan Value (2000–2023)",
             fontsize=13, fontweight='bold', pad=12)
ax.set_xlabel("Total Loan Value (USD Million)", fontsize=11)
ax.xaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:,.0f}M'))

# Add value labels
for bar in bars:
    ax.text(bar.get_width() + 5, bar.get_y() + bar.get_height()/2,
            f"${bar.get_width():,.0f}M",
            va='center', ha='left', fontsize=8)

# Legend for highlights
from matplotlib.patches import Patch
legend_elements = [Patch(facecolor='#e67e22', label='Togo (case study)'),
                   Patch(facecolor='#2980b9', label='South Africa (case study)'),
                   Patch(facecolor='#27ae60', label='Ethiopia (case study)'),
                   Patch(facecolor='#c0392b', alpha=0.8, label='Other countries')]
ax.legend(handles=legend_elements, loc='lower right', fontsize=9)

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig2_ict_by_country.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()
No description has been provided for this image

2. Beyond Loans: FDI and Trade as Indicators of Structural Dependence¶

The loan figures represent only one facet of Chinese digital participation. To assess structural reliance, we have to consider FDI inflows and the trade relationship. Chinese FDI inflows into Africa have increased from less than 0.1 billion dollars in 2003 to surpassing $4 billion per year during the mid-2010s before tapering off. The most crucial takeaway here is the sectoral breakdown of these investments, which are mostly in construction, mining, and manufacturing industries (USBEA, 2025). It highlights the discrepancy between the DSR’s digital narrative and the actual allocation of Chinese funds.

The chart below shows the comparative trend of Chinese and US FDI inflows into Africa. The importance of this graph lies in the fact that the EU Global Gateway has positioned itself as an alternative not just to China, but to all of them collectively.

In [7]:
fdi = df_fdi_graph.dropna(subset=['Year', 'China_FDI_bn'])
fdi = fdi[fdi['Year'] >= 2003]

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(13, 5))

ax.plot(fdi['Year'], fdi['China_FDI_bn'],
        color='#c0392b', linewidth=2.5, marker='o', markersize=5, label='China FDI Flow to Africa')
ax.plot(fdi['Year'], fdi['US_FDI_bn'],
        color='#2980b9', linewidth=2.5, marker='s', markersize=5, label='US FDI Flow to Africa', linestyle='--')

ax.fill_between(fdi['Year'], fdi['China_FDI_bn'], alpha=0.08, color='#c0392b')

ax.set_title("China vs. US FDI Flows to Africa (2003–2024)",
             fontsize=14, fontweight='bold', pad=12)
ax.set_xlabel("Year", fontsize=11)
ax.set_ylabel("FDI Flow (USD Billion)", fontsize=11)
ax.yaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:.1f}bn'))
ax.legend(fontsize=10)
ax.axvline(x=2021, color='green', linestyle=':', linewidth=1.5, alpha=0.7)
ax.text(2021.1, fdi['China_FDI_bn'].max() * 0.85,
        'EU Global Gateway\nlaunched (2021)', fontsize=8, color='green')

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig3_fdi_comparison.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()
No description has been provided for this image
In [9]:
# Read directly from the raw export and import sheets
df_ex_raw = pd.read_excel(TRADE_FILE, sheet_name='CN_EXtoAfr', header=0)
df_ex_raw.columns = df_ex_raw.iloc[0]
df_ex = df_ex_raw.iloc[1:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_ex.rename(columns={df_ex.columns[0]: 'Year'}, inplace=True)
df_ex['Year'] = pd.to_numeric(df_ex['Year'], errors='coerce')

df_im_raw = pd.read_excel(TRADE_FILE, sheet_name='CN_IMfromAfr', header=0)
df_im_raw.columns = df_im_raw.iloc[0]
df_im = df_im_raw.iloc[1:].reset_index(drop=True)
df_im.rename(columns={df_im.columns[0]: 'Year'}, inplace=True)
df_im['Year'] = pd.to_numeric(df_im['Year'], errors='coerce')

# Pull the pre-calculated totals column from each sheet
df_ex['Total_EX'] = pd.to_numeric(df_ex['Total, US$ mn'], errors='coerce')
df_im['Total_IM'] = pd.to_numeric(df_im['Total, US$ mn'], errors='coerce')

# Merge on Year
trade_clean = pd.merge(
    df_ex[['Year', 'Total_EX']],
    df_im[['Year', 'Total_IM']],
    on='Year', how='inner'
)
trade_clean = trade_clean.dropna(subset=['Year', 'Total_EX', 'Total_IM'])
trade_clean = trade_clean[trade_clean['Year'] >= 2000]

# Convert from USD mn to USD bn
trade_clean['Total_EX_bn'] = trade_clean['Total_EX'] / 1000
trade_clean['Total_IM_bn'] = trade_clean['Total_IM'] / 1000

print("Trade data preview:")
print(trade_clean.head())
print(f"\nYears covered: {int(trade_clean['Year'].min())} – {int(trade_clean['Year'].max())}")

# ── Plot ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(13, 5))

ax.stackplot(trade_clean['Year'],
             trade_clean['Total_EX_bn'],
             trade_clean['Total_IM_bn'],
             labels=['China Exports to Africa', 'China Imports from Africa'],
             colors=['#c0392b', '#e74c3c'], alpha=[0.85, 0.5])

ax.set_title("China–Africa Trade Volume (2000–2024)",
             fontsize=14, fontweight='bold', pad=12)
ax.set_xlabel("Year", fontsize=11)
ax.set_ylabel("Trade Value (USD Billion)", fontsize=11)
ax.yaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:.0f}bn'))
ax.legend(loc='upper left', fontsize=10)

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig(r"C:\Users\Lenovo\Downloads\fig4_trade_volume.png", dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()
Trade data preview:
0     Year      Total_EX      Total_IM  Total_EX_bn  Total_IM_bn
8   2000.0   5007.117655   4852.661844     5.007118     4.852662
9   2001.0   5959.776793   4081.154683     5.959777     4.081155
10  2002.0   6918.366806   4608.572201     6.918367     4.608572
11  2003.0  10124.757426   7409.089806    10.124757     7.409090
12  2004.0  13729.951398  13740.248388    13.729951    13.740248

Years covered: 2000 – 2024
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3. Case Studies: Digital Infrastructure on the Ground¶

3.1 South Africa: Huawei/ZTE vs. BCX/MTN¶

South Africa has the most advanced digital economy on the African continent and thus represents its most important strategic battleground for infrastructure. Huawei has won contracts with South Africa's three major mobile operators (Vodacom, MTN, and Rain) for 4G and early 5G roll-outs. ZTE also provides equipment to multiple ISPs.

The local alternative, represented by BCX (a subsidiary of Telkom) and MTN's push for vendor diversification, has been embraced because South African regulators and civil society have expressed concerns about network security and data sovereignty. The South African government's 2021 Cybersecurity Policy highlighted the security risks posed by third-party infrastructure without naming vendors, a tactic reminiscent of the EU's approach. The EU Global Gateway's Digital4Development initiative has since partnered with South African stakeholders on open RAN and interoperability standards to avoid vendor lock-in.

3.2 Togo: Novissi and the Dual Edge of Digital Dependence¶

One of the most well-known examples of AI-based social protection in the Global South is Togo's Novissi programme. It was set up in 2020 during the pandemic, using satellite imagery and machine learning to map poverty at the pixel level, and then made cash payments through mobile money (T-Money and Flooz) to beneficiaries (more than 800,000 people).

The programme is technically impressive. But it also raises a key question about digital autonomy: Togo's mobile money system is highly dependent on Chinese network infrastructure (Huawei provided the 4G network roll-out under a 2014 loan) and the AI analytic tools were designed in collaboration with UC Berkeley's GovLab. China supplies the hardware, the US the algorithms, which exemplifies digital autonomy. African countries can be both customers of Chinese infrastructure and collaborators in Western-designed digital platforms.

The EU's interest in Novissi-like platforms under Digital4Development is real, but the EU has not invested in upstream infrastructure to enable such platforms.

3.3 Ethiopia: Green Industrial Parks and the Digital-Industrial Nexus¶

Ethiopia's Hawassa Industrial Park, constructed and funded in part by Chinese loans, was celebrated as a green manufacturing facility. Ethiopia also had its first green industrial park 100% powered by renewables, with Chinese advice and support, in 2023. This raises a point for the digital question: China's engagement is increasingly integrating physical infrastructure (electricity, telecoms, logistics) into "packages" that create systemic dependencies beyond individual loans.

The FOCAC 2024 commitment of $50.7 billion (analysed by ACCPA) explicitly mentions 30 clean energy projects and 20 digital infrastructure projects. If executed as an integrated whole, this forms a networked dependency which the EU (funding projects piecemeal through multiple instruments - EFSD+, Global Gateway, Horizon) cannot replicate as quickly and effectively.

In [12]:
case_countries = ['Togo', 'South Africa', 'Ethiopia']
colors = {'Togo': '#e67e22', 'South Africa': '#2980b9', 'Ethiopia': '#27ae60'}

df_cases = df_ict[df_ict['Country'].isin(case_countries)].copy()
df_cases['Year'] = df_cases['Year'].astype(int)

fig, axes = plt.subplots(1, 3, figsize=(15, 5), sharey=False)

for ax, country in zip(axes, case_countries):
    data = (df_cases[df_cases['Country'] == country]
            .groupby('Year')['Loan (USD M)'].sum().reset_index())
    
    if data.empty:
        ax.text(0.5, 0.5, f'No ICT loans\nrecorded for\n{country}',
                ha='center', va='center', transform=ax.transAxes,
                fontsize=12, color='gray')
    else:
        ax.bar(data['Year'], data['Loan (USD M)'],
               color=colors[country], alpha=0.85, edgecolor='white')
        ax.yaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:.0f}M'))
    
    ax.set_title(country, fontsize=13, fontweight='bold', color=colors[country])
    ax.set_xlabel("Year", fontsize=10)
    ax.set_ylabel("Loan Value (USD M)", fontsize=10)
    ax.tick_params(axis='x', rotation=45)

fig.suptitle("Chinese ICT Loans — Case Study Countries", fontsize=14, fontweight='bold', y=1.02)
plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig5_case_study_loans.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()

# Print summary stats
for country in case_countries:
    total = df_ict[df_ict['Country'] == country]['Loan (USD M)'].sum()
    count = len(df_ict[df_ict['Country'] == country])
    print(f"{country}: {count} ICT loans | Total: ${total:,.1f}M")
No description has been provided for this image
Togo: 4 ICT loans | Total: $133.2M
South Africa: 0 ICT loans | Total: $0.0M
Ethiopia: 7 ICT loans | Total: $3,112.5M

4. The EU Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan: A Credible Alternative?¶

The EU Global Gateway, launched in December 2021 with a headline budget of €300 billion by 2027, is intended as a "values-based" alternative to China's BRI. The digital component of the Gateway, led by Digital4Development (D4D) targets connectivity, digital literacy, e-government and regulatory harmonisation with GDPR and EU cybersecurity requirements.

In Africa, the EU has backed projects like the Connect Africa satellite broadband project, alliances with consortia of undersea cables, and national data protection laws based on the EU model. These are meaningful contributions. At the same time there are some constraints on the Gateway's effectiveness:

  • Fragmented: EU programs (EFSD+, Horizon Europe, Team Europe) work through various channels and generate coordination problems on the ground.
  • Agility: Chinese government-backed finance is quicker. A deal for a national backbone with Huawei can be signed within months; EU blended finance instruments take years to come to fruition.
  • Scale: The 300bn is public and private finance over six years. Chinese ICT loans in the CARI database alone total more than $6bn - not to mention private investments by Huawei, ZTE and Alibaba.
  • Conditionality: EU regulatory conditionality (data governance, procurement transparency) is a double-edged sword it demonstrates value alignment but lowers its adoption by governments that favour speed over standards.

The Mattei Plan, unveiled by the Italian government in 2023, is an effort to provide the Global Gateway with a more defined bilateral approach in Africa. The plan, named after ENI founder Enrico Mattei, focuses on energy, food security, education, water and health with a digital dimension focused on connectivity and skills. The Mattei Plan is particularly significant in North and Saharan African countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Ethiopia, where Chinese and European interests converge, due to Italy's historical and geographic proximity.

Both the Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan are the EU's best effort to date in providing African partners with an alternative. The challenge is whether "value-based" funding can challenge "results-based" funding in the short time frames that African policymakers work on.

In [13]:
# Curated comparison data (sourced from literature and FOCAC/Global Gateway documents)
categories = [
    'Total Finance\nCommitted ($bn)',
    'ICT-Specific\nLoans ($bn)',
    'Speed of\nDisbursement\n(1=slow, 5=fast)',
    'Regulatory\nConditionality\n(1=low, 5=high)',
    'Local Content\nRequirements\n(1=low, 5=high)',
    'Data Governance\nStandards\n(1=low, 5=high)'
]

# Normalised scores (0–10) for radar / bar comparison
china_scores  = [50.7, 6.2,  4.5, 1.5, 2.0, 1.5]
eu_scores     = [54.0, 2.1,  2.0, 4.5, 3.5, 4.5]

x = np.arange(len(categories))
width = 0.35

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(13, 6))

bars1 = ax.bar(x - width/2, china_scores, width,
               label="China (DSR / FOCAC 2024)", color='#c0392b', alpha=0.85, edgecolor='white')
bars2 = ax.bar(x + width/2, eu_scores, width,
               label="EU (Global Gateway + Mattei Plan)", color='#2980b9', alpha=0.85, edgecolor='white')

ax.set_title("China DSR vs. EU Global Gateway — Digital Engagement Comparison",
             fontsize=13, fontweight='bold', pad=12)
ax.set_xticks(x)
ax.set_xticklabels(categories, fontsize=9)
ax.set_ylabel("Score / Value", fontsize=11)
ax.legend(fontsize=10)

# Annotate
for bar in bars1:
    ax.text(bar.get_x() + bar.get_width()/2., bar.get_height() + 0.1,
            f'{bar.get_height():.1f}', ha='center', va='bottom', fontsize=8, color='#c0392b')
for bar in bars2:
    ax.text(bar.get_x() + bar.get_width()/2., bar.get_height() + 0.1,
            f'{bar.get_height():.1f}', ha='center', va='bottom', fontsize=8, color='#2980b9')

ax.text(0.5, -0.18,
        "Note: Finance figures in USD bn. Speed/Conditionality/Standards scored 1–5 based on comparative literature.",
        ha='center', transform=ax.transAxes, fontsize=8, color='gray')

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig6_eu_vs_china_comparison.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()
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5. Assessing Digital Autonomy: A Framework¶

Digital autonomy in the African context can be disaggregated into four dimensions:

Dimension Indicator China DSR EU Global Gateway
Infrastructure sovereignty Vendor diversity, ownership of backbone Low: Huawei/ZTE dominant Medium: promotes open RAN, mixed vendors
Data governance National data laws, cross-border data flows Low: limited conditionality High: GDPR-aligned frameworks
Economic agency Local content, tech transfer, jobs Medium: some local hiring Medium: regulatory, less capital
Political leverage Debt exposure, renegotiation power High risk: 21% of external debt Low risk: grant-heavy instruments

Neither actor is clearly working towards enabling African digital sovereignty. China moves fast on infrastructure roll-out, which is undoubtedly a positive development in terms of development. Yet, China creates structural dependence with its practices of indebtedness, vendor dependency, and poor data governance practices. The EU encourages regulatory sovereignty but does not have the financial momentum to move the needle on infrastructural projects.

Yet, African agency is not missing in action. As the ACCPA analysis of FOCAC 2024 shows, African governments are now more focused when dealing with their counterparts, demanding technology transfers, manufacturing capacities, and debt restructuring as opposed to just listening to grandiose promises. The example of Novissi shows that African countries are able to benefit from Chinese infrastructure while also partnering with Western organizations in the analytical/governance layer.

In [14]:
sector_totals = (df_cla.groupby('Sector')['Loan (USD M)']
                 .sum()
                 .sort_values(ascending=True))

colors_sector = ['#c0392b' if s == 'Information and Communication Technology'
                 else '#bdc3c7' for s in sector_totals.index]

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(11, 7))
bars = ax.barh(sector_totals.index, sector_totals.values,
               color=colors_sector, edgecolor='white', alpha=0.9)

ax.set_title("Chinese Loan Commitments to Africa by Sector (2000–2023)",
             fontsize=13, fontweight='bold', pad=12)
ax.set_xlabel("Total Loan Value (USD Million)", fontsize=11)
ax.xaxis.set_major_formatter(mticker.FuncFormatter(lambda x, _: f'${x:,.0f}M'))

for bar in bars:
    ax.text(bar.get_width() + 20, bar.get_y() + bar.get_height()/2,
            f"${bar.get_width():,.0f}M", va='center', fontsize=8)

from matplotlib.patches import Patch
legend_els = [Patch(facecolor='#c0392b', label='ICT (Digital Silk Road focus)'),
              Patch(facecolor='#bdc3c7', label='Other sectors')]
ax.legend(handles=legend_els, fontsize=9)

plt.tight_layout()
plt.savefig('fig7_sector_breakdown.png', dpi=150, bbox_inches='tight')
plt.show()

pct = sector_totals['Information and Communication Technology'] / sector_totals.sum() * 100
print(f"ICT share of total Chinese lending to Africa: {pct:.1f}%")
No description has been provided for this image
ICT share of total Chinese lending to Africa: 8.4%

6. Discussion¶

This report's empirical findings enable us to answer our research question. The Digital Silk Road is a significant presence in Africa: 160 ICT loan commitments worth $15.26 billion between 2000 and 2023, or 8.4% of all Chinese sovereign lending to the continent. This is no minor effort, it is a government-backed strategy to push Chinese vendors and standards into Africa's digital infrastructure.

There are a number of important insights in the data. First, Ethiopia stands out as the most vulnerable case study state with 7 ICT loans worth 3.1 billion dollars, a figure that reflects the tactics of China to combine digital infrastructure with energy and industrial investment, as is the case with "green" industrial parks. In contrast, Togo received $133.2 million in 4 loans, much smaller, but still enough to support the mobile infrastructure supporting Novissi. The absence of South Africa from the sovereign lending database is telling: Chinese digital influence in SA is through commercial agreements between Huawei/ZTE and private telecommunications companies (MTN, Vodacom), thus not involving sovereign debt. This implies that the CLA alone understates the impact of the Digital Silk Road in more advanced African economies.

Second, the data on FDI and trade put the lending data in perspective. Chinese FDI in Africa spiked in the early 2010s, but has since declined, while trade - especially Chinese exports to Africa - has steadily increased, implying that Africa remains a recipient rather than a manufacturer for China. This points to the importance of digital autonomy: a continent that imports its digital hardware, software platforms and network equipment from a single supplier has little bargaining power.

Third, the EU Global Gateway contrast reveals an alternative, but limited model. The EU's regulation and governance efforts - data governance in line with General Data Protection Regulation, open RAN standards, cybersecurity conditionality - address the aspects of digital autonomy missing in Chinese finance. Yet, the pace, duration and scope of China's state-supported finance remain unmatched. The Mattei Plan introduces bilateral clarity to EU engagement, but it does not solve the problem of the mismatch between the values-based and results-based nature of financing, and the short-termism of African governments.

The most critical point, though, is that African digital autonomy is not simply a by-product of external competition. The Togolese Novissi case shows a type of multi-alignment strategy: Chinese infrastructure provides the base for a Western-designed AI governance system, while the Togolese government retains program management. The ACCPA's analysis of the $50.7bn commitment made at FOCAC 2024 reveals African leaders increasingly playing a more specific game, seeking technology transfer, local content and debt restructuring, rather than passive capital imports. Digital autonomy, therefore, is a negotiation rather than a determinant.

Conclusion¶

Drawing on empirical evidence on Chinese lending, FDI and trade, alongside Silk Road and the EU Global Gateway shapes digital autonomy in Africa. Digital Silk Road and the EU Global Gateway in Africa.

Three key findings emerge:

First, the DSR has a significant and tangible material presence in Africa: 160 ICT loan commitments totaling 15.26 billion dollars in Africa between 2000 and 2023, or 8.4% of all Chinese sovereign loans to Africa. The infrastructure the loans fund is tangible, developmental and entrenching all at once. Ethiopia received 3.1 billion dollars of it, and even smaller states like Togo received sufficient funds to sustain nationally important digital platforms such as Novissi. Second, the EU Global Gateway is an important but limited option. It contributes to regulatory and governance, and the Mattei Plan provides bilateral consistency to Italian activity in Africa. Yet, neither initiative can yet compete with the speed, scale and integration of Chinese state financing. Competition in the E|U is the governance layer, data sovereignty, cybersecurity standards, interoperability, not the infrastructure build-up. Third, African digital sovereignty is not just about dominance by external actors. Examples such as Novissi in Togo show African states can engage in multi-alignment, using Chinese infrastructure while working with western institutions on data analytics and governance. The ACCPA's focus on FOCAC 2024 confirms this point: African leaders are engaging more assertively, seeking technology transfer, local content, and debt relief rather than simply receiving financial assistance. The $50.7 billion question is not then about what China gives, but what Africa can get from multiple external actors to build digital infrastructure on its terms. The evidence suggests they can, but only if African governments continue to reject the binary choice of Chinese speed vs European standards.

References¶

CFPA. (n.d.). On Financial Pledges in FOCAC Summit: $50.7 Billion Question.

CLA. (2024). Chinese Loans to Africa Database | Global Development Policy Center. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinese-loans-to-africa-database-data-download/

Statista. (2024). China: Outward FDI stock in Africa by sector 2024. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/730065/china-outward-fdi-stock-africa-by-sector/?srsltid=AfmBOopjnGmFdoDYDTY-pZ6RjLdUSiQDAdY8ylgBHPpu3XTnfgbpwawX

USBEA. (2025). Data: Chinese Investment in Africa. China Africa Research Initiative. https://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa